Ebook Philosophy in neuroscience mobi,epub

levels of organization of cognitive phenomena. He concludes that although neuroscientific explanation provides invaluable insights at the neural level of organization, it is insufficient for a comprehensive account of mental phenomena. The subsequent chapter Theoretical Unification and the Neural Engineering Framework by Marcin Miłkowski is an attempt to answer the question of whether the Neural Engineering Framework (NEF) is a possible unifying framework of explanation in cognitive neuroscience. According to Philip Kitcher, one can deal with the objections to the received view of scientific explanation (the covering-law account developed by Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim) in two distinct ways: by dispensing with the argument-like structure of the explanation and saving its causal character, or by accepting the argument-like structure and rejecting the concept of a law. After analyzing seve­ral counterexamples to Kitchers unification account, Miłkowski argues that is not an adequate background for testing NEFs explanatory power. Miłkowski claims further that NEF exhibits the properties of frameworks that can serve as means of theoretical unification. On the basis of two case studies, one pertaining to the research on the navi­gational capabilities of rats and the other to the analysis of human performance in Wason selection tasks, Miłkowski claims that NEF offers a common methodology that unifies research on quite diffe­rent phenomena. The paper by Radosław Zyzik, Biological Determinism and Its Enemies, develops an account of biological determinism based on insights from neuro­science, behavioural genetics and neurogenetics. Zyzik analyzes three case studies: the famous neuroscientific experiment of Benjamin Libet (and its redesigns) concerning the neural basis of decision-making processes, the research on a single-gene defect of phenylketonuria which leads to severe retardation, and the neurogenetic research on C. Elegans - a model organism for the investigation of the interplay between genes, the nervous system and the environment. On the basis of his analysis, Zyzik argues that our knowledge about the biological factors determining behaviour is fragmentary at best, and the thesis of biological determinism, as proposed by many of its contemporary adherents, is ill-founded. Wojciech Grygiel, in Quantum Mechanics and Its Role in Cognitive Sciences: A Critical Survey, reviews and critically assesses the applications of quantum mechanics in the explanation of neural and mental phenomena. The paper begins with an outline of the aspects of quantum mechanics presumably relevant for the research in cognitive science. Grygiel underlines, however, that due to the scale of single neurons, quantum effects may be extremely short-lasting to be of any relevance at the neuronal level. Next, the analysis of several proposals of the utilization of quantum mechanics in cognitive science is carried out: Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroffs, John C. Eccles, Henry Stapps and David Chalmers. It is argued that at least the latter three accounts offer strong support for mind-body dualism. Further­more, as Grygiel claims, in all of those proposals it is difficult to explain in detail how quantum effects are supposed to influence neural activity. Moreover, Stapps and Chalmers understanding of the ­relation between quantum mechanics and mental phenomena rests on some dubious philosophical assumptions. The second part of the collection, At the Border Between Neuroscience and Philosophy, is devoted to more concrete issues arising at the intersection of both disciplines. Łukasz Kurek in Philosophical Issues in the Neuroscience of Mindreading: The Case of Belief proposes a philosophical account of belief developed in the context of the neuroscience of mindreading (, the ability to predict, explain, and describe peoples behaviour). He outlines how the concept of belief is understood in the so-called theory-theory of mindreading and the simulation theory of mind. Furthermore, he argues that on the theory-theory view belief is understood as involving complex and flexible cognitive processes, correlated with specific parts of the brain such as right temporo-parietal junction. On the other hand, within the simulation theory, belief-like states involve simple and inflexible cognitive processes, correlated with such parts of the brain as amygdala. Kurek claims that both these accounts are only partially correct and argues for the hybrid account of mindreading. According to this view, belief can be understood as a mental state utilized in high-level (complex and flexible) mindreading. The following paper by Julia Stanek, Self-Consciousness: From Philosophy to Neuroscience, investigates some selected aspects of the problem of self-consciousness on the basis of several approaches: the philosophical, psychological, sociological, clinical and the neuroscien­tific. Stanek provides an overview of the conceptions of self-consciousness