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broader sense; this picture is historically faithful, because all three views were and are pointed out as atheist. Atheism and agnosticism accept the statement I do not know that God exists and I believe that God does not exist. I propose to count this attitude as indirect atheism. If we take the set {theism, fideism, atheism, agnosticism}, all of the standpoints listed in it are mutually independent and contrary, but not all are mutually contradictory. Theism in the broader sense and indirect atheism are also contraries, but the former is inconsistent with atheism in the broader sense. The above analysis is based on a purely formal criterion. This does not preclude that particular views differ in their account of how knowledge and faith are related. Now, I can supplement remarks (see above) about various motives of religious belief. Let me start with fideism. The fideist will probably say that he or she accepts (5), but providing that knowledge as applied to religion is of a special kind and, therefore, I know in the religious discourse has a specific meaning, different from that in the statement I know that 2 is the first prime number. Thus, when the fideist announces that we have no rational knowledge of Gods existence, that is, based on intersubjectively accessible empirical evidence, this does not exclude another kind of experience, for example, mystical experience. A more ordinary understanding of fideism is perhaps given by: (42) I believe that God exists, although I have no rational support for my belief and I claim that there are no rational reasons for denying Gods existence. Yet I think that (39) gives a better account of fideism, at least for its logical analysis and provided that I know refers to rational knowledge. Logical reasons also dictate that I prefer I know (do not know) that God exists than I know (I do not know) whether God exists. The theist of the Thomistic brand (or more generally, recommended by the Catholic Church) accepts the equivalence (i) KA <=> BA and justifies this by the above quoted formula fides quaerens intellectum, at least so far as the matter concerns the existence of God. Pragmatically speaking, faith (religious belief) is the starting point and its equivalence with knowledge is dictated by ratio recta. Since (i) holds for ?KA and ?BA as well, the theist has to accept it, too. According to standard theism, (ii) ?KA <=> ?BA describes unbelievers. They do not believe if and only if they do not know. Their lack of knowledge and belief may be unconscious and non-culpable, but if it is deliberate, they are deprived of ratio recta. Paradoxically, the atheist also shares (i) and (ii), but the motivation is different here. First of all, the atheist strengthens (ii) to (iii) K?A <=> B?A, because atheism consists in a positive view about Gods non-existence, not only in expressing the lack of knowledge and faith concerning His non-existence. Thus, the atheist asserts (iv) K?A <=> ?KA, (v) B?A <=> ?BA, and (vi) K?A <=> B?A, and argues that the theist abuses the concept of knowledge. In other words, the atheist maintains that belief and knowledge as attitudes concerning (***) should be entirely rational. This position is best expressed by (vi), but (ii) holds only because KA and BA are false. Finally, the atheist can agree that KA and BA are true, but knowledge, belief and truth are understood differently than in rational discourse. Since (i)-(vi) do not follow from (D), their acceptance or rejection has their source in decisions motivated by various factors. The agnostic proceeds similarly to the fideist in the matter of the relation between knowledge and faith, namely he or she derives some consequences from the lack of knowledge. However, agnosticism insists that knowledge should be taken as rational, but belief as rational if it is grounded by knowledge, otherwise it is irrational. Thus, there are obvious affinities between atheism and agnosticism. The skeptic, according to his or her general epistemological position, is completely neutral about the above issues. Skepticism is not particularly interesting, because it consists of merely negative assertions. The remaining views propose at least some positive beliefs, but theism and atheism additionally insist that their adherents know something about Gods existence or non-existence. A positive element in belief or knowledge seems to be of the utmost importance for world-view matters, because negative declarations do not suffice in this area. Although, on the one hand, every view (I omit skepticism) in the set {theism, fideism, atheism, agnosticism} is contrary to the rest, on the other hand, theism and atheism operate on a different epistemological level than fideism and agnosticism. In particular, the latter assume epistemological skepticism concerning the knowledge of Gods existence, but reject theological skepticism in this question. This positive content, directly related to theology in the case of fideism and indirect